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If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself.
- James Madison1
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article is about deferred action and transparency in related
immigration cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). While scholars from other genres have
written extensively on the topic of prosecutorial discretion, the subject is largely absent from immigration scholarship, with the exception of early research conducted by Leon Wildes in the late 1970s
and early 2000s,2 and a law review article I published in 2010 outlin1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 286 (James Madison) (Scott ed., 2002).
2. See Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service:
Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1980) [herein-
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ing the origins of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law and
related lessons that can be drawn from administrative law and criminal law.3 That article ends with specific recommendations for the
agency, such as codifying deferred action into a regulation and recognizing it as a formal benefit as opposed to a matter of “administrative convenience,” and streamlining the array of existing memoranda
of prosecutorial discretion floating within each DHS agency.4 An
additional recommendation included increasing oversight of prosecutorial discretion to ensure that officers and agencies that fail to
exercise prosecutorial discretion by targeting and enforcing the laws
against low-priority individuals are held accountable.
In this Article, and building upon recommendations published in
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law,5 I describe the state of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular by surveying the political climate, public reaction, and advoafter Wildes, The Operations Instructions]; Leon Wildes, The United States Immigration Service v. John Lennon: The Cultural Lag, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1974);
Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1977) [hereinafter Wildes, The Litigative Use of the
FOIA]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Concern for Aliens, Part I,
53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 25 (January 26, 1976) [hereinafter Wildes, The
Nonpriority Program Part I]; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service - A Measure of the Attorney General’s Concern for Aliens, Part II, 53 INTERPRETER RELEASES 33 (January 30, 1976) [hereinafter Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part II]; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible
Remedy for Impossible Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819 (2004) [hereinafter Wildes, A Possible Remedy].
3. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010).
4. ICE prefaced its most recent memorandum on prosecutorial discretion as
building upon the pre-existing memoranda. See John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of
the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter Morton
Memo on Prosecutorial
Discretion],
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
5. See Wadhia, supra note 3, at 293–99.

File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2

4

Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

Vol. 10 No.1

cacy efforts in the last two years. I also chronicle my repeated Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to DHS for information
about deferred action, and the stumbling blocks I encountered during
this 19-month journey. The Article will show that while deferred
action is one of the very few discretionary remedies available for
noncitizens with compelling equities, it currently operates as a secret
program accessible only to elite lawyers and advocates. Moreover,
the secrecy of the program has created the (mis)perception by some,
that deferred action can be used as a tool to legalize the undocumented immigrant population or ignore congressional will. This
Article explains why transparency about deferred action is important
and makes related recommendations that include, but are not limited
to, subjecting the program to rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedures Act, issuing written decisions when deferred action is
denied, posting information about the application process, and maintaining statistics about deferred action decisions. Without these
remedies, noncitizens that possess similarly relevant equities will
face unequal hardships.
A. Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet-level
agency with jurisdiction over many immigration functions.6 The
Department has jurisdiction over immigration “services” such as
asylum, citizenship, and green card applications;7 border-related enforcement actions such as border patrol and inspections;8 and interior
enforcement activities, such as the detention and removal of noncitizens.9 The immigration court system is called the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) and rests within the Department of

6. See
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
7. See
U.S.
CITIZENSHIP
AND
IMMIGRATION
SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
8. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ (last
visited Aug. 9, 2011).
9. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
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Justice.10 Removal proceedings are initiated by DHS and operate as
adversarial hearings at which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement attorneys represent the DHS. On the other hand, noncitizens are entitled to find their own lawyers at no expense to the government.11 Many noncitizens in removal proceedings are unrepresented because the proceeding itself is considered “civil” and without guaranteed safeguards like court-appointed counsel.12 At a removal proceeding, an Immigration Judge reviews allegations and
charges with the noncitizen defendant, as well as enters pleas.13 If
appropriate, the Immigration Judge presides over applications for
relief from removal such as asylum, adjustment of status, and cancellation of removal.14 The noncitizen bears the burden of proving that
she is eligible for such relief.15 Decisions by the Immigration Judge
may be appealed with the Board of Immigration Appeals.16 Not every noncitizen residing or entering the United States without legal
authority is placed in removal proceedings.17 Some are removed
expeditiously by the Department through other means, while others
are considered for prosecutorial discretion.18
10. See
EXECUTIVE
OFFICE
FOR
IMMIGRATION
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last visited July 17, 2011).

REVIEW,

11. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
12. For a more detailed look at noncitizens’ lack of representation, see Donald
Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, 2 INSIGHT (MIGRATION
POLICY
INSTITUTE)
(Apr.
2005),
available
at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf; Andrew I. Shoenholtz
& Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration Adjudications Through Competent
Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55–56 (2008).
13. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited Aug.
9, 2011).
14. Id.
15. See U. S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/04/ReliefFromRemoval.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
16. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. Note that this background section is intended as a brief review of the Department of Homeland Security and the removal process. For a more detailed
discussion of the removal process and the agency components involved, see Wadhia, supra note 3. For an organizational chart listing the different components of
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A favorable exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” identifies the
Department of Homeland Security’s authority to not assert the full
scope of the agency’s enforcement authority in each and every
case.19 The Department’s motivations for exercising prosecutorial
discretion are largely economic and humanitarian.20 According to
the agency’s own statistics, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) has the resources to remove less than 4% of the total undocumented population.21 Moreover, many individuals and groups who
present redeeming qualities such as lengthy residence, employment
or family ties in the United States, and/or intellectual, military, or
professional promise are living in the United States, vulnerable to
immigration enforcement and without a statutory vehicle for legal
status. In the first two years of the Obama Administration, such humanitarian cases have swelled in the wake of congressional stalemates over even discrete immigration reforms. At one time, prosecutorial discretion was called “nonpriority” and later “deferred action,” but today, prosecutorial discretion is associated with many

DHS and a description of each, see Organizational Chart, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
19. See, e.g., Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5;
memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, on Prosecutorial
Discretion, 2, 8 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Howard Memo], available at
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration2005.pdf;
memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, 2 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INSGuidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00; memorandum
from John Morton, Director, Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, 4 (March 2, 2011 ) [hereinafter
Morton
Memo
on
Civil
Enforcement
Priorities],
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; memorandum from John Morton, Director, Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims,
Witnesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo on Certain
Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/domestic-violence.pdf; memorandum from Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary, Prosecutorial and Custody Discretion, 4 (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file
with author);
20. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1.
21. Id.
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different actions by the government.22 For example, a DHS officer
can exercise favorable discretion by granting a temporary stay of
removal, joining in a motion to terminate removal proceedings,
granting an order of supervision, cancelling a Notice to Appear, or
granting deferred action.23 Prosecutorial discretion can also be exercised during different points in the enforcement process, including,
but not limited to, interrogation, arrest, charging, detention, trial, and
removal.24
This Article is limited to the Department’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular. This Article does
not discuss immigration adjudications before DHS (beyond deferred
action) or the EOIR. Notably, many scholars have written extensively about immigration adjudications in these contexts.25 On the other
hand, I rely on process values that have been analyzed in other immigration adjudicatory contexts to analyze and advance the importance of transparency in deferred action.
B. Summary of Deferred Action Process
In theory, any person who is in the United States without authorization may apply for deferred action before any component of DHS,
including CBP, ICE, and USCIS. Oft-times deferred action requests
are reviewed by a local office, and following up to three levels of
review, are either granted, denied, or unresolved.26 There is no for22. Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 820-23; see Morton Memo on
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2;
Howard Memo, supra note 19, at 2.
23. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 2; Howard
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2.
24. See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note4, at 2; Howard
Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 2.
25. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication
Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); Steven Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635 (2010); Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent
Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13-1
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1, 3 (2008).
26. See, e.g., Ombudsman Recommendation: Recommendations on USCIS Deferred Action Processing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (July 11,
2011), http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/cisomb-recommendation.shtm (citing
the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 442(c), 116
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mal deferred action application form or fee. Upon receiving deferred action, the person may remain in the United States and may
apply for work authorization unless, and until, the agency decides to
target the person for enforcement under the immigration laws.27
Specifically, the regulations governing immigration contain a specific subsection for individuals applying for work authorization on the
basis of deferred action.28 If a person is denied deferred action, there
is no mechanism for review by the Department or the immigration
court, nor is there a guarantee that the person will receive a notification about the Department’s decision.29 Because deferred action is a
function of prosecutorial discretion, decisions are generally immune
from judicial review in the absence of equal protection claims involving “outrageous discrimination.”30 Moreover, decisions about
deferred action often rest with one agency and in many cases nonattorney employees of the Department, despite the fact that grave
consequences attach when an agency fails to consider or denies a
person deferred action status.31 As of this writing, the Department
does not keep public records about deferred action grants, nor does it

Stat. 2135, 2194); Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, Delegation to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Mar. 1, 2003) (delegating authority to grant voluntary departure under section 240B of the INA 8
U.S.C. § 1229c, and deferred action).
27. See id.
28. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2011) (“An alien who has been granted deferred action, an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives
some cases lower priority, if the alien establishes an economic necessity for employment . . . .”).
29. While the June 17 memorandum from DHS on prosecutorial discretion includes some additional procedures that would include a case to be initiated by the
ICE officer, private attorney, or ICE agent, it does not appear to include a specific
method for notifying the noncitizen when they have been denied deferred action.
See Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4.
30. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999).
31. Notably, the June 17, 2011 Morton Memo on prosecutorial discretion enables
ICE attorneys to review the charging decisions by ICE, CBP, and USCIS. See
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3. By including and
amplifying the role of the ICE attorney, the memo includes an important and new
check to the deferred action process before ICE and prosecutorial discretion generally. See id.

File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2

2012

Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW

9

make information about the program available on its website, forms,
or memoranda.
II. DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Operations Instruction and Meissner Memo
Two seminal policy statements on deferred action that have survived enormous structural changes of the immigration agency and
immigration statute include a former “Operations Instruction” on
deferred action, and a memorandum published by former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner.32 The Operations Instruction (O.I.) was
revealed in the 1970s in connection with litigation filed on behalf of
John Lennon. That now-defunct Operations Instruction advises officers to consider:
(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years' presence
in the United States; (3) physical or mental condition
requiring care or treatment in the United States; (4)
family situation in the United States—effect of expulsion; (5) criminal, immoral or subversive activities or
affiliations. If the district director's recommendation
is approved by the regional commissioner the alien
shall be notified that no action will be taken by the
Service to disturb his immigration status, or that his
departure from the United States has been deferred
indefinitely, whichever is appropriate.33
That Operations Instruction was the subject of significant courtroom traffic beginning in the late 1970s that revolved around whether deferred action operates as a substantive benefit or an act of pure
administrative convenience.34 Concluding that the O.I. on deferred
32. Meissner Memo, supra note 19; (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975).
33. (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions,
O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975).
34. See Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 732 F.2d 792, 798 (10th Cir. 1984);
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 661 (11th Cir. 1983); Nicholas v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1979); Soon Bok Yoon v.
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action operated like a substantive benefit, the Ninth Circuit in Nicholas v. INS articulated the five criteria listed in the O.I., the directive
language of the O.I., and the fact that a grant of deferred action provided the benefit of “an indefinite delay in deportation.”35 From the
agency’s point of view, the tension of what to call deferred action
(administrative convenience or substantial benefit) was eliminated
with a tweaking of the O.I. in 1981 and more explicit language in
future memoranda including the Meissner Memo.36
Published in 2000, the Meissner memo identifies a list of examples of factors that should be considered by immigration officers in
making prosecutorial decisions like deferred action, including, but
not limited to:
 immigration status of the applicant;
 length of residence in the United States;
 criminal history and circumstances surrounding
such history;
 humanitarian concerns such as family times, tender age at the time of entry into the United States,
special medical conditions or conditions and circumstances in the country to which the beneficiary could be potentially removed; likelihood of
being removed;
 current or past cooperation with law enforcement;

Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976); Lennon
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975); Wan
Chung Wen v. Ferro, 543 F. Supp. 1016, 1017–18 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Zacharakis
v. Howerton, 517 F. Supp. 1026, 1027–28 (S.D. Fla. 1981); see also Siverts v.
Craig, 602 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Haw. 1985) (construing 1981 instruction).
35. Nicholas, 590 F.2d at 806–807.
36. The relevant part of the amended instruction reads “Deferred action. The
district director may, at his discretion, recommend consideration of deferred action, an act of administrative choice to give some cases lower priority and in no
way an entitlement, in appropriate cases . . . .” (Legacy) Immigration and Naturalization Service, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1981). Despite the
disclaimers placed in the amended O.I. and subsequent memoranda, the data below combined with the agency’s continued application of deferred action based on
specific factors present a strong argument for recognizing deferred action as a
substantive benefit.
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service in the U.S. military; immigration history;
and
likelihood that she could be eligible for a legal
immigration status in the future among other factors.37

B. Morton Memoranda
In the last two years, the immigration agency has published additional guidance about its authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion.38 In June 2010, ICE issued a broad memorandum about its
“Civil Enforcement Priorities” and limited resources, highlighting
the importance of prosecutorial discretion during the apprehension,
detention, and removal of noncitizens.39 The memo reaffirms earlier
memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and further states “Particular
care should be given when dealing with lawful permanent residents,
juveniles, and the immediate family members of U.S. citizens.”40 In
37. Meissner Memo, supra note 19, at 7–8.
38. For a detailed description of memoranda and policy about prosecutorial
discretion prior to 2010, see Wadhia, supra note 3.
39.
Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 1. EOIR
highlighted the relationship between implementation of the June 2010 Morton
Memo and an increased detained docket at EOIR. Immigration Court System:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
Juan P. Osuna, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2011/EOIRtestimony05182011.pdf (“As DHS
enforcement programs reach their full potential, EOIR is planning ahead and shifting resources to meet the anticipated corresponding increase in the agency’s detained caseload.”). Note that Morton’s June 30, 2010 memo on Civil Enforcement
priorities was reissued by ICE on March 2, 2011, with one additional clause at the
end to confirm that the memo itself did not create any right or benefit or limit the
legal authority of ICE to enforce immigration laws. See Morton Memo on Civil
Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4 (“These guidelines and priorities are
not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any administrative,
civil, or criminal matter.”).
40. Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities, supra note 19, at 4. For an
in-depth analysis of the June 30 Morton memo, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Reading the Morton Memo: Federal Priorities and Prosecutorial Discretion,
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER-AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 46-
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June 2011, ICE issued another memorandum on prosecutorial discretion that was intended to support the Morton Memo on Civil Enforcement Priorities and also build upon many of the historic policy
memoranda by INS and DHS on the subject of prosecutorial discretion.41 The broad Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion contains a tone similar to previous memoranda in that it identifies the
resource limitations of the agency, furnishes a laundry list of largely
humanitarian factors that ICE may consider in deciding whether or
not to assert the full scope of enforcement authority available to ICE,
and “clarifies” that the directive itself confers no right to the noncitizen or limitation on the agency to apprehend, detain, or remove
“any” alien unlawfully within the United States.42 The factors posted for consideration by ICE include, but are not limited to:




the agency's civil immigration enforcement priorities;
the person's length of presence in the United
States, with particular consideration given to
presence while in lawful status;
the circumstances of the person's arrival in the
United States and the manner of his or her entry,
particularly if the alien came to the United States
as a young child;

2010 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Reading the Morton Memo], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1723165.
41. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 1. ICE issued a
second memorandum on prosecutorial discretion specific to certain victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs. See Morton Memo on Certain Victims, Witnesses, and
Plaintiffs, supra note 19. This memo highlights the importance of exercising
prosecutorial discretion towards:
victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious
crimes; witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations or
prosecutions; plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil
rights or liberties violations; and individuals engaging in a protected activity related to civil or other rights who may be in a
non-frivolous dispute with an employer, landlord, or contractor.
Id. at 2. That memo also states somewhat conclusively “[I]t is against ICE policy
to initiate removal proceedings against an individual known to be the immediate
victim or witness to a crime.” Id. at 1.
42. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 4, 6.
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the person's pursuit of education in the United
States, with particular consideration given to
those who have graduated from a U.S. high
school or have successfully pursued or are pursuing a college or advanced degrees at a legitimate
institution of higher education in the United
States;
whether the person, or the person's immediate relative, has served in the U.S. military, reserves, or
national guard, with particular consideration given
to those who served in combat;
the person's criminal history, including arrests,
prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants;
the person's immigration history, including any
prior removal, outstanding order of removal, prior
denial of status, or evidence of fraud;
whether the person poses a national security or
public safety concern;
the person's ties and contributions to the community, including family relationships;
the person's ties to the home country and condition in the country;
the person's age, with particular consideration
given to minors and the elderly;
whether the person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent;
whether the person is the primary caretaker of a
person with a mental or physical disability, minor,
or seriously ill relative;
whether the person or the person's spouse is pregnant or nursing;
whether the person or the person's spouse suffers
from severe mental or physical illness;
whether the person's nationality renders removal
unlikely;
whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from re-
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moval, including as a relative of a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident;
whether the person is likely to be granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from removal, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim
of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other
crime; and
whether the person is currently cooperating or has
cooperated with federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S Attorneys or Department of Justice, the Department of
Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among
others.43

The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion also articulates
that “particular care” should be given to the following classes of individuals:









veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces
long-time lawful permanent residents
minors and elderly individuals
individuals present in the United States since
childhood
pregnant and nursing women
victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other
serious crimes
individuals who suffer from serious mental or
physical disability; and
individuals with serious health conditions.44

43. Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 5. For a detailed analysis about the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial
Discretion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Morton Memo and Prosecutorial
Discretion: An Overview, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, 6 (July 20, 2011), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/morton-memo-andprosecutorial-discretion-overview-0.
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The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion is somewhat
unique from previous memoranda in that it explicates who within
ICE has authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion and the special
role of ICE attorneys to “exercise prosecutorial discretion in any
immigration removal proceeding before EOIR” including any removal proceedings that have been proposed by CBP or USCIS.45
Rather than relying on the initial charging agency’s decision to issue
an NTA, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion suggests that
the ICE Chief Counsel or Deputy Director for ICE should handle
any conflicts that arise between the charging agency and the ICE
trial attorney seeking to exercise prosecutorial discretion.46
C. Other ICE Policies
ICE also released a “toolkit” for U.S. Prosecutors in April 2011,
which contains a separate section on prosecutorial discretion and the
related tools of deferred action and administrative stays of removal.47
In describing the concept of deferred action, the toolkit advises:
Deferred Action (DA) is not a specific form of relief
but rather a term used to describe the decision-making
authority of ICE to allocate resources in the best possible manner to focus on high priority cases, potentially deferring action on cases with a lower priority.
There is no statutory definition of DA, but federal
regulations provide a description: “[D]eferred action
[is] ‘an act of administrative convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority. . . .’”
There are two distinct types of DA requests: (i) those
seeking DA based on sympathetic facts and a lowenforcement priority, and (ii) those seeking DA based
on his/her status as an important witness in an investigation or prosecution. Basically, DA means the
45. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 3.
46. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, see Wadhia, supra note 44, at 5.
47. Protecting the Homeland: Toolkit for Prosecutors, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
4–8
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/osltc/pdf/tool-kit-for-prosecutors.pdf.
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government has decided that it is not in its interest to
arrest, charge, prosecute or remove an individual at
that time for a specific, articulable reason.48
The enforcement activities of ICE bear a direct relationship to
the activities undertaken by the immigration court system, housed
within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration
Review.49 EOIR assumes jurisdiction of immigration cases once a
Notice to Appear (NTA) is filed with the immigration court.50 A
wide array of Department employees have the authority to assemble
a NTA, which in and of itself raises concerns about the quality and
consistency of NTA issuance. According to recent data calculated
by the American Bar Association:
The number of Notices to Appear (NTA) issued by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to initiate removal proceedings grew by 36% in just two
years, from 213,887 in FY 2006 to 291,217 in FY
2008. These numbers are expected to increase as
DHS focuses on apprehending and removing all criminal noncitizens, such as through the Secure Communities initiative.51
In addition, and in response to an overwhelmed immigration
court system, ICE published guidance for dismissing select cases
before EOIR where a benefit such as a marriage-based green card
could be conferred by USCIS.52 Specifically, the memo advises the
48. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
49. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
(last visited July 17, 2011).
50. See Jurisdiction and Commencement of Proceedings Rule, 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.14 (2011) (“(a) Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration
Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court
by the Service. . . .”).
51. Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the Immigration Court System:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
Karen
T.
Grisez,
American
Bar
Association),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011may18_gri
sezs_t.authcheckdam.pdf.
52. Memorandum from John Morton on Guidance Regarding the Handling of
Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or Approved Applications or Peti-
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ICE Office of Chief Counsel to “dismiss” removal cases before the
immigration court involving “adjustment of status” (green card) cases in which the applicant appears eligible for a green card. The purpose of this guidance is to reduce the number of cases pending at the
EOIR.53 The need for operationalizing a policy dismissing cases in
which the noncitizen is eligible for an immigration benefit before the
United States was underscored by EOIR Director Juan Osuna’s recent recitation about the current number of cases pending at EOIR.
At the end of FY 2010, EOIR’s immigration courts
had 262,622 proceedings pending, marking an increase of more than 40,000 proceedings pending over
tions, 2–4 (Aug. 20, 2010), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/detentionreform/pdf/aliens-pending-applications.pdf.
53. Id. at 3. The relevant section of that memo states:
As a matter of prosecutorial discretion and to promote the efficient use of government resources, I hereby issue new ICE policy to govern the handling of removal proceedings involving aliens with applications or petitions pending with USCIS. This
policy extends both to the prosecution of removal proceedings
by OCCs and to any associated detention decisions by Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).
...
Where there is an underlying application or petition and ICE determines in the exercise of discretion that a non-detained individual appears eligible for relief from removal, OCC should
promptly move to dismiss proceedings without prejudice before
EOIR.
...
Only removal cases that meet the following criteria will be considered for dismissal:
The alien must be the subject of an application or petition filed
with USCIS to include a current priority date, if required, for adjustment of status;
The alien appears eligible for relief as a matter of law and in the
exercise of discretion;
The alien must present a completed Application 10 Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form 1-485), if required;
and
The alien beneficiary must be statutorily eligible for adjustment
of status (a waiver must be available for any ground of inadmissibility).
Id. at 2–3.
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the end of FY 2009. In the first half of FY 2011, that
pending caseload grew by an additional 9,400. This
caseload is directly tied to annual increases in cases
filed in the immigration courts by DHS. In FY 2010,
the immigration courts received 325,326 proceedings.
By contrast, in FY 2007, proceedings received were
279,430.54
III. THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION AND DEFERRED ACTION
A. Legislative Stalemates and Deferred Action
The 2009–11 legislative debate on immigration helps demonstrate the political context under which deferred action has been
spotlighted.55 Efforts by select members of Congress, attorneys, and
pro-immigration advocates to advance broad immigration reforms
were unsuccessful despite the promise proffered by the Obama Administration in 2008.56 In December 2010, the Senate failed to move
54. See Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2. In response to the
swelling court docket and recent Morton Memos, the American Bar Association
has further recommended that:
DHS personnel should be encouraged to reduce the burden on
the removal adjudication system by exercising discretion to not
serve a Notice to Appear on noncitizens who are prima facie eligible for relief from removal, to concede eligibility for relief
from removal after receipt of a clearly meritorious application,
to stop litigating a case after key facts develop that make removal unlikely, or to waive appeal in certain appropriate types of
cases.
Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7. It should also be noted, the new
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion and its focus on the role of ICE trial
attorneys when appearing before EOIR in removal proceedings has the potential to
reduce the docket at EOIR, especially if the memo becomes a tool for the ICE trial
attorney to join in motions to terminate or dismiss cases that are not among the
priorities identified by ICE.
55. This article does not attempt to analyze “why legislative reform has failed”
nor does it suggest that prosecutorial discretion can ever be a substitute for such
reforms.
56. Immigration Policy: Transition Blueprint, OBAMA-BIDEN TRANSITION
PROJECT, 20–21 (2008), available at http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?
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forward on the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), a bill that would have provided legal status
to eligible young residents who have been in the United States for an
extended period of time, finished high school, and plan to enter college; after several years in “conditional” resident status, the DREAM
Act would have enabled young people who have completed higher
education or service in the military to achieve permanent residence
in the United States.57 To many advocates, the failure of the
DREAM Act was symbolic of an Administration with little will and,
more importantly, a Congress unwilling to put the policy of regularizing status for arguably the most sympathetic population in the
United States, namely, young people with great intellectual promise
whose immigration status was beyond their control, before politics.58
Weeks later, the 112th Congress opened up with a cadre of congressional members at the National Press Club highlighting the benefits
of repealing birthright citizenship.59 That Congress was willing to
renounce children and infants, speaks volumes to the political landscape on “the Hill” with respect to the immigration question.60
Whereas President Obama has made public announcements and
docid=27611&linkid=188816. For a longer discussion about previous efforts to
enact legislative reform, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of
Immigrants’ Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 410–18 (2007).
57. See Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010, S.
3992, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03992:; Development, Relief, and Education for Alien
Minors Act of 2010, H.R. 6497, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR06497:.
58. See, e.g., Brian Naylor, Democrats Push DREAM Act; Critics Call It Amnesty, NPR.ORG (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/06/131796206/
democrats-push-dream-act-critics-call-it-amnesty.
59. Julia Preston, State Lawmakers Outline Plans to End Birthright Citizenship,
Drawing Outcry, NY TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/
06/us/06immig.html.
60. See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, H.R. 140, 112th Cong. (1st
Sess.
2011),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr140ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr140ih.pdf; Marc Lacey, Birthright Citizenship
Looms as Next Immigration Battle, NY TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/05/us/politics/05babies.html; Washington Post
Staff, DREAM Act delayed in Senate: Prospects of cloture by year's end fading,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/ 2010/12/09/AR2010120903504.html.
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hosted a handful of stakeholder meetings about the importance of
comprehensive immigration reform, the outcome as of this writing
has not led to any serious proposal by Congress about reforming
immigration holistically, a legislative scheme that in past years has
included a statutory update to the family and employment-based
immigration system, a legal pathway for noncitizens to enter the
United States in the future on the basis of work or a family relationship, and a registration program that enables individuals and other
special populations such as high school students and migrant workers currently in the United States without authorization to come before the government and apply for a legal visa.61
Meanwhile, staff members of USCIS circulated an internal draft
memorandum outlining potential ways in which the agency could
reprieve individuals and certain classes of persons who are ineligible
for legal immigration status, but who nonetheless exhibit compelling
qualities or equities.62 In discussing deferred action, that memorandum acknowledged that it could be used as a tool to protect certain
individuals or groups from the threat of removal.63
USCIS can increase the use of deferred action. Deferred action is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
61. For a sampling of President Obama’s public discussion about comprehensive
immigration reform, see David Jackson, Obama talks immigration with officials -but no members of Congress, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 2011,
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/04/obama-talksimmigration-with-officials----but-no-members-of-congress/1; Julie Mason, President Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul, POLITICO.COM (MAY 10, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54696.html;. For an analysis of previous congressional proposals on comprehensive immigration reform; PRESIDENT
OBAMA
ON
COMPREHENSIVE
IMMIGRATION
REFORM,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obamacomprehensive-immigration-reform (last visited July 17, 2011). See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Policy and Politics of Immigrants’ Rights, supra note 56; Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration: Mind Over Matter, 5 U. OF MD. L. J. ON RACE,
RELIGION,
GEND.
&
CLASS
201
(2005),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346586.
62. Memorandum from Denise A. Vanison, et al, to Alejandro Mayorkas, on
Administrative Alternatives to Comprehensive Immigration Reform (undated) (on
file with author), available at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/memo-onalternatives-to-comprehensive-immigration-reform.pdf.
63. Id. at 10–11.
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not to pursue removal from the U.S. of a particular
individual for a specific period of time . . . . Were
USCIS to increase significantly the use of deferred
action, the agency would either require a separate appropriation or independent funding stream. Alternatively, USCIS could design and seek expedited approval of a dedicated deferred action form and require
a filing fee.64
B. Congressional Criticism of Deferred Action
Following the “leak” of the draft USCIS memo, select members
of Congress freed themselves from working on a legislative solution
and instead criticized the Department for its modest exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Notably, in a congressional hearing dated
March 9, 2011, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) interrogated DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano about a memorandum drafted by a staff
member at USCIS containing, among other things, a discussion
about the use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular.65 The Secretary indicated that the Department had made
roughly 900 deferred action grants, juxtaposing the agency’s
395,000 removals during the same time period.66 Pro-immigration
advocates were stunned by the record low number of actual deferred
action grants in contrast with the previous Administration.67 For
example, the American Immigration Lawyers Associationwrote to
the Secretary: “We are concerned that in your testimony on March 9
before the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding prosecutorial discretion, you highlighted that the number of cases where discretion
was favorably exercised was very small, suggesting that your department is discouraging and limiting its exercise.”68 Following the

64. Id.
65. Department of Homeland Security Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary,
1
(Apr.
6,
2011),
available
at
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Senate hearing, La Opinion, the largest Hispanic newspaper in the
United States, reported that DHS granted deferred action to only 542
individuals. The pro-immigration group America’s Voice pulled
together a chart below based on the data from La Opinion and concluded: “According to our calculations, the Bush Administration
averaged 771 deferred action grants and 301,418 deportations from
2005-2008, while the Obama Administration averaged 661 deferred
action grants and 391,348 deportations its first two years in office . .
. .”69

The publication of the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion
spurred a new wave of congressional criticism against the agency’s
use of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular. On
June 23, 2011, Congressman Lamar Smith announced his plans to
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/AILA-AICNapolitano-4-6-2011.pdf.
69. Dara Lind, La Opinion: Obama Has Granted a Record Low Number of Deferred Actions to Immigrants, AMERICA’S VOICE (Apr. 28, 2011),
http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/entry/la_opinion_obama_has_granted_a_recor
d_low_number_of_deferred_actions.
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introduce the “HALT (Hinder the Administration’s Legalization
Temptation) Act” and issued a related “Dear Colleague” letter. 70
The HALT Act was introduced in July 2011 in both the House of
Representatives and Senate and, among other provisions, would prevent DHS from granting deferred action as a matter of prosecutorial
discretion and “suspend” the handful of discretionary remedies
available under the immigration laws for compelling cases.71 The
politics behind the HALT Act are plentiful and illustrated in part by
the fact that the bill expires on January 21, 2013, at the end of President Obama’s first term.72 The HALT Act was the centerpiece of a
hearing in the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement on July 26, 2011.73
Like with Lamar Smith and congressional members who support
the HALT Act, the ICE union criticized the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, calling such policies a “law enforcement nightmare” and “just one of many new ICE policies in queue aimed at
stopping the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws in the United
States . . . . Unable to pass its immigration agenda through legislation, the Administration is now implementing it through agency pol-

70. “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chairman, to members of Congress (June 23, 2011), available at
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/Smith_DearColleague.pdf.
71. Id. at 2–3. See also Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation
Act (HALT Act), H.R. 2497, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2497ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr2497ih.pdf;
Hinder the Administration’s Legalization Temptation Act (HALT Act), S. 1380,
112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112s1380is/pdf/BILLS-112s1380is.pdf. On a historical note, in 1999, Representative Lamar Smith went on record supporting prosecutorial discretion by coauthoring a letter from select members of Congress to the immigration agency.
For a copy of the letter and commentary about Rep. Smith’s reverse position on
prosecutorial discretion, see Editorial, The Forgetful Mr. Smith, NY TIMES, July
12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/opinion/13wed3.html.
72. See “Dear Colleague” letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm.
Chairman, supra note 70, at 3; see also Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R.
2497, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_07262011_2.html (last visited July 31,
2011).
73. Hearing Information: Hearing on H.R. 2497, supra note 72.
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icy.”74 The union’s president, Chris Cane, testified at the July 26,
2011, hearing which attacked the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial
discretion and ICE’s lack of guidance and resources to implement
the memo.75
Adding fuel to the fire, Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas) accused
DHS of operating a secret policy of dismissing high priority immigration cases as a matter of prosecutorial discretion after his staff
reviewed a series of internal memoranda and emails retrieved by the
Houston Chronicle.76 On July 5, 2011, House Judiciary Committee
Chairman Lamar Smith (R-Texas) and Homeland Security Subcommittee Chairman Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) sent a letter to Secretary Janet Napolitano chronicling the release of various draft and
official agency memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and expressing concerns that these memos are being used to “circumvent Congress and use executive branch authority to allow illegal immigrants
to remain in the United States.”77 On July 13, 2011, and citing to the
Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, Orrin Hatch, former
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, joined Sen. Jeff Ses74. Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Agent’s
Union Speaks Out on Director’s “Discretionary Memo” Calls on the public to take
action, 1 (June 23, 2011), available at http://www.iceunion.org/download/286287-press-release-pd-memo.pdf.
75. Immigration Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Chris Crane, President, National Immigration and Customs Enforcement Council 118 American Federation of Government Employees), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Crane07262011.pdf. Beyond the
scope of this article but noteworthy are Crane’s remarks about the importance of
training, and the ostentatious lack of training or guidance field officers received on
the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion prior to its publication.
76. See Susan Carroll, Report: Feds downplayed ICE case dismissals; Documents show agency had approval to dismiss some deportation cases, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE,
June
27,
2011,
5:30
AM,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7627737.html; Susan Carroll,
Cornyn presses Napolitano over immigration case dismissals, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE,
June
28,
2011,
5:30
AM
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/chronicle/7631394.html.
77. Letter from Lamar Smith, House Judiciary Comm. Chairman, and Robert
Aderholt, Homeland Security Subcomm. Chairman to Janet Napolitano, DHS
Secretary,
1
(July
5,
2011),
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Administrative%20Amnesty.pdf.
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sions (R-Ala.) and four more Republican colleagues in urging U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to stop trying to
“grant administrative amnesty to millions of illegal aliens” and to
start enforcing immigration laws.78
C. Congressional Support for Deferred Action
Deferred action has not been contentious with every Member of
Congress. Select Members of Congress have taken positions supporting the executive branch’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
For example on April 13, 2011, 22 U.S. Senators sent a letter to
President Obama urging him to grant deferred action to qualifying
DREAM Act students who are not a law enforcement priority to
DHS.79 The letter states:
We would support a grant of deferred action to all
young people who meet the rigorous requirements
necessary to be eligible . . . under the DREAM
Act. . . . We strongly believe that DREAM Act students should not be removed from the United States,
because they have great potential to contribute to our
country and children should not be punished for their
parents’ mistakes.80
In their letter, the Senators are critical of the Department’s lack
of a process for applying for deferred action and the fact that many
DREAM Act students are unaware of this form of relief.81 On the
78. Press Release, Sen. Orrin Hatch, Hatch, Senate Colleagues Press U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Laws (July 13, 2011),
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ContentRecord_id=86f43fd7bb7c-4d03-8bb8-f83ea8468843.
79. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, 2 (Apr.
13, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53014785/22-Senators-LtrObama-Relief-for-DREAMers-4.
80. Id. For an example of a DREAM Act student granted deferred action, see
Michigan Student's Deportation Put On Hold, Warren Student Wants To Graduate, Continue Schooling At University Of Michigan, CLICKONDETROIT.COM (last
updated
May
25,
2011,
9:36
AM),
http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/28010704/detail.html.
81. Letter from Harry Reid, Senator, et al., to President Barack Obama, supra
note 79, at 2.
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heels of this letter, Senator Charles Schumer, a Democrat from New
York and Chair of the Judiciary Committee remarked in another letter to DHS:
According to a March 2, 2011 memorandum of John
Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE only has the funding to remove
400,000 individuals per year. Given that this entire
number can be filled by criminal aliens and others
posing security threats, it makes eminent sense to focus ICE's enforcement efforts on these criminals and
security threats, rather than non-criminal populations.
On a daily basis, my office receives requests for assistance in many compelling immigration cases. These
cases often involve non-criminal immigrants such as:
(1) high-school valedictorians and honor students
who did not enter the country through their own volition and yet are being deported solely for the illegal
conduct of their parents; (2) bi-national same-sex
married couples who are being discriminated against
based on their sexual orientation who would otherwise be able to remain in the United States if they
were in an opposite-sex marriage; (3) agricultural
workers who perform back-breaking labor and are
providing for their families; and (4) immigrant parents with U.S. citizen children, whose deportation
will only lead to increased costs to the states in foster
care and government benefits.82
On June 28, 2011, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) indicated that he
would be sending his own letter to the Department in support of deferred action for DREAM Act students, remarking, “I'd like to let
everyone know that today I'll be sending a letter, my own letter, to
the president in support of deferred action . . . . I think it is the least

82. Letter from the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration to Janet Napolitano,
DHS
Secretary
(Apr.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://arnolaw.blogspot.com/2011/04/letter-from-senate-judiciary.html.
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that we can do to stop this injustice from getting any worse.”83 And
on July 21, 2011, seventy-five Democratic members from the House
of Representatives sent a letter to President Obama critical of Republican efforts to freeze executive branch authority by introducing legislation like the HALT Act.84 Likewise, Democratic members of the
House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement expressed their opposition to the HALT Act at the July 26, 2011, hearing and the importance of preserving the few discretionary remedies
available under the immigration laws, like deferred action. Rep. Zoe
Lofgren (D-CA) expressed her disbelief that Congress would waste
so much time on a bill like the HALT Act and pointed to the unintended human consequences if the legislation were enacted.85
Meanwhile, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) focused on the politics of the
HALT Act noting that “[The HALT Act] is not an attack on the
Presidency, but an attack on the President himself.”86
D. Public Activities and Support for Prosecutorial Discretion
The political context for, and lack of, transparency of deferred
action is also illustrated by the public’s response to the various agency memoranda and legislative reactions to prosecutorial discretion in
the last two years. This section illustrates the activities and positions
on prosecutorial discretion by select bar associations, journalists, and
immigration advocates since the 2010 publication of The Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law. Relying on its

83. DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (statement of Sen. Al Franken).
84. Letter from Democratic members from the House of Representatives to President
Barack
Obama,
1
(July
21,
2011),
http://www.gutierrez.house.gov/images/stories/HALT_Act_letter_complete.pdf.
85. See The Hinder the Administration's Legalization Temptation Act: Hearing
on H.R. 2497 before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3–4 (2011).
86. Id. at 5. For a short analysis of the HALT Act and related politics, see Marshall Fitz, HALT the Insanity: New Hyperpartisan Bill Tries to Handcuff the President,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS
(July
25,
2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/halt_act.html.

File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2

28

Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

Vol. 10 No.1

groundbreaking report on immigration adjudications,87 the American
Bar Association testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
May 17, 2011, highlighting the importance of prosecutorial discretion:
Prioritization, including the prudent use of prosecutorial discretion, is an essential function of any adjudication system. Unfortunately, it has not been widely
utilized in the immigration context. There are numerous circumstances in which a respondent is not
likely to be removed regardless of the outcome of the
legal case. The most obvious cases are those where
the respondent is terminally ill or is the parent or
spouse of someone who is critically ill, but there are
other examples where it is clear from the circumstances at the beginning of the process that the interests in removing the respondent will almost certainly
be outweighed on humanitarian or other grounds.88
The American Immigration Lawyers Association and its sister
group, American Immigration Council, have also published information about prosecutorial discretion. To illustrate, the Immigration
Council published a practice advisory for immigration attorneys
about the strategies and forms of prosecutorial discretion, as well as
an article on the highs and lows of the June 30, 2010, Morton
Memo.89 Similarly, the American Immigration Lawyers Association
conducted a nationwide poll of its more than 11,000 members regarding their experiences with prosecutorial discretion requests to

87. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_services/immigration.html (last visited
July 18, 2011).
88. Statement of Karen T. Grisez, supra note 51, at 7.
89. See Prosecutorial Discretion: How to Advocate for Your Client, LEGAL
ACTION CENTER (June 24, 2011), http://www.legalactioncenter.org/practiceadvisories/prosecutorial-discretion-how-advocate-your-client; Wadhia, Reading
the Morton Memo, supra note 40, at 4. See also Just The Facts, IMMIGRATION
POLICY CENTER, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/executive-actionresource-page (last visited July 18, 2011).
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ICE,90 and received more than 200 responses. AILA sent a follow
up letter to DHS remarking:
Many of these cases involve people who, if deported,
would be separated from U.S. citizen and Lawful
Permanent Resident immediate family members who
depend on their noncitizen relatives for care and support. Several cases involve people who suffer from
severe medical conditions; who are victims of domestic violence, trafficking or other serious crimes; or
who are serving as valuable witnesses in criminal
prosecutions. Many are students whose academic
performance shows great promise for their ability to
contribute to this nation in the future.91
Similarly, the former president of AILA, David Leopold, published an article in Bloomberg Law Reports describing the concept
of prosecutorial discretion and authorities of the Executive Branch to
grant deferred action in compelling cases.92 Likewise, attorney
Margaret Stock testified about the importance of deferred action at
the July 26, 2011, hearing on the HALT Act by showcasing the
types of individuals that would be deported without the discretionary
relief the HALT Act seeks to “halt.”93 One example provided by
Professor Stock in her written testimony included:
An example of a person who will be harmed immediately by passage of the HALT Act is Fereshteh Sani,
a woman whose father and mother were executed by
90. Prosecutorial
Discretion
Survey,
AILA
(2011),
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/LMMTBSG.
91. Letter from AILA and Immigration Council to Janet Napolitano, DHS Secretary, supra note 68, at 2. 2 (Apr. 6, 2011).
92. David W. Leopold, What Legal Authority Does President Obama Have to
Act on Immigration?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 2 (May 16, 2011), available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=35404.
93. Executive Immigration Enforcement Limitations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement and the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, University of Alaska Anchorage), available at U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE
ON
THE
JUDICIARY,
3–4
(2011)
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Stock07262011.pdf.
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Iranian government officials in 1988. Fereshteh has
been in the United States since 1999, and has graduated from college and medical school here; she is currently a resident in Emergency Medicine at Bellevue
Hospital in New York City. She is in the United
States on a grant of deferred action, which is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2011.94
Like the private bar associations, and following the administrative and legislative roadblocks on immigration during the first two
years of the Obama Administration, public policy think-tanks, advocacy groups, and law firms have published affirmative positions on
deferred action and prosecutorial discretion more generally. For
example, the Migration Policy Institute highlighted the importance
of prosecutorial discretion in a 2011 report highlighting actions for
the Executive Branch in the absence of legislative reform.95 Specifically, the MPI report recommends that the Government develop a
uniform set of enforcement priorities and, in cases of lesser priority,
exercise prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action with
work authorization.96 Similarly, the 10,000 membership organization NAFSA: Association of International Educators highlighted the
importance of prosecutorial discretion in a May, 2011, press release
stating:
We urge President Obama to exercise his executive
authority and act now to direct the Department of
Homeland Security to implement such a deferredaction policy. This is a matter of humanitarian necessity, and it would represent the kind of national leadership that is needed to move the one-sided, enforcement-first debate about immigration that has so far

94. Id. at 9.
95. Donald M. Kerwin, Doris Meissner & Margie McHugh, Executive Action on
Immigration: Six Ways to Make the System Work Better, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE, 14–19 (2011), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/administrative
fixes.pdf.
96. Id.
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poisoned prospects for what is ultimately needed –
comprehensive reform – in a more fruitful direction.97
Law firms, law clinics, and advocacy organization have also assembled practical tools for noncitizens potentially eligible for deferred action. In May 2011, Duane Morris, Maggio Kattar, and
Pennsylvania State University’s Dickinson School of Law published
a practitioner’s toolkit addressing private bills and deferred action,
underscoring the dearth of information about how to go about applying for deferred action and the heightened importance of pursuing
these forms of relief.98 Developed to help immigration judges, lawyers, public officials, and nonprofit groups navigate what has become a last-resort option for those facing deportation, the toolkit
includes “Best Practices” from attorneys around the country; a summary of the laws and procedures governing deferred action and private bills; sample letters of support, exhibit lists, and legal briefs;
and selected resources.99 In June, 2011, Asian Law Caucus, Educators for Fair Consideration, DreamActivist.org, and National Immigrant Youth Alliance published a resource manual titled “Education
Not Deportation: A Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal
Proceedings.”100 This manual is “intended to aid certain undocumented students and their lawyers to fight effectively throughout a
removal (deportation) proceeding.”101 The production of these
toolkits underscores the absence of quality information about the
deferred action program and procedures.
The growing chorus of immigration attorneys, advocates, and
media outlets speaking about the importance of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law is striking and in part responds to their frustration about the stalemate in Congress over immigration. While I
97. Press Release, NAFSA: Association of International Educators, NAFSA
Statement on Immigration Reform and Undocumented Students (May 10, 2011),
http://www.nafsa.org/PressRoom/PressRelease.aspx?id=26639.
98. New toolkit sheds light on lesser known immigration remedies, PENN STATE
LAW (May 17, 2011), http://law.psu.edu/news/immigration_toolkit.
99. Id.
100. Guide for Undocumented Youth in Removal Proceedings, ASIAN LAW
CAUCUS,
http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/alc/publications/guide-forundocumented-youth-in-removal-proceedings/ (last visited July 18, 2011).
101. Id. at 6.
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disagree with those who label the recent agency memoranda on
prosecutorial discretion as a “backdoor amnesty” or alternative for
legislation like the DREAM Act, I nevertheless believe that some
potential beneficiaries of immigration legislation are likely to carry
qualities that resemble the equities listed in the O.I., Meissner
Memo, and Morton Memoranda. As such, it should not be surprising that some would-be DREAM Act beneficiaries for example, are
also deserving of deferred action.102
IV. ANALYZING DEFERRED ACTION CASES
A. Previous Empirical Studies
Leon Wildes is an attorney who represented the former Beatle
John Lennon in his immigration case.103 Believing that Lennon’s
prosecution by INS was politically motivated, Wildes (on behalf of
Lennon) corresponded with INS for more than one year to gain information about INS’ deferred action program.104 Conceding that
records pertaining to the deferred action were not specifically exempt from the FOIA, and moreover existed as an identifiable “class
or category” of documents, INS provided Wildes with case histories
of 1843 deferred action cases granted by INS.105 Upon examining
the 1843 cases, Wildes calculated that deferred action was granted to
individuals subject to a spectrum of deportability or excludability
grounds, and suggested that equitable factors played are far greater
role in the outcome than the actual charge.106

102. For a longer explanation about why prosecutorial discretion cannot serve as
a substitute for legislative reforms, see Wadhia, supra note 3, at 297–98.
103. E.g., Wadhia, supra note 3, at 246-47; Wildes, The Litigative Use of the
FOIA, supra note 2, at 42.
104. Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 45; Wildes, The
Nonpriority Program Part I, supra note 2; Wildes, The Nonpriority Program Part
II, supra note 2; Wildes, The Cultural Lag, supra note 2, at 280. See generally
Wildes, The Operations Instructions, supra note 2 (discussing the importance of
John Lennon’s immigration case as the first to provide the public with knowledge
of the Nonpriority Program).
105. Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 48–49.
106. Id. at 52–53 & n.35.
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In Wildes’s study, more than 98% of the deferred action cases
granted by INS involved one of the following discernable factors
that drove the agency’s decision: individuals who were of tender age
or elderly age; mentally incompetent; medically infirm; or would be
separated from their family members if deported.107 Separation from
family was the greatest category of cases analyzed by Wildes that
led to a favorable decision by the agency.108 Moreover, a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) family member was involved in more than 80% of the 1,843 cases granted.109 This data
indicates that the presence of a family member with long-term ties to
the United States was important, but not always determinative, to
whether or not the agency granted deferred action.
Seeking to update his 1979 article on deferred action, Wildes
filed FOIA requests to the Central, Western, and Eastern Regional
offices of USCIS for all records of cases in which deferred action
was granted.110 Wildes received information from the Central and
Western regions, which cumulated to 499 deferred action cases.111
Wildes received some cases that were denied or discontinued.112
The data indicated that nearly 89% of the deferred action cases furnished to Wildes were granted.113 Like his 1979 study, Wildes
found that USCIS was granting deferred action based on a strict set
of criteria as opposed to arbitrarily.114 Specifically, the cases granted
deferred action fell within seven specific categories: (1) separation
of family; (2) medically infirm; (3) tender age; (4) mentally incompetent; (5) potential negative publicity; (6) victims of domestic violence; and (7) elderly age.115 In both studies, Wildes found that separation from a family member was an overriding factor in deferred

107. Id. at 53 & n.36.
108. Id. at 53, 58.
109. Id. at 60 & n.45.
110. Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 825.
111. Id. at 826–27.
112. Id. at 826 & n.44 (“The calculation assumes that all relevant cases, whether
approved, denied, or removed by the two regions, were released and forwarded to
[Wildes].”).
113. Id. at 826.
114. Id. at 830.
115. Id.
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action grants.116 The second greatest operating factor for cases
granted in the 2003 study was medical infirmity, which according to
Wildes included “life-threatening” situations such as HIV and cancer.117 These figures indicate that both in 1976 and in 2003, the
agency relied predominantly on humanitarian criteria in granting
deferred action.118
B. FOIA Requests to ICE
I filed my first FOIA request to ICE on October 6, 2009, requesting for all records and policies involving prosecutorial discretion. A
reply letter from ICE was sent on November 19, 2009, acknowledging receipt of the request, assigning a control number to the request,
and stating that ICE had “queried the appropriate program offices
within ICE for responsive records.”119 On November 30, 2009, another letter was sent from ICE stating that the request was “overly
broad” and requesting clarification.120 On December 19, 2009, less
than thirty days later, a clarifying letter was sent to ICE.121 On February 3, 2010, the status of the request was “administratively
closed.”122 According to ICE, my request was closed on December
30, 2009, because there was “no response to letter requesting additional information.”
I sent a new FOIA request to ICE on March 30, 2010, containing
an expanded request for information on prosecutorial discretion and

116. Wildes, A Possible Remedy, supra note 2, at 831 & n.64.
117. Id. at 831–32.
118. Id. at 832.
119. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Keenan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 19, 2009) (assigning to the
request reference number: 2010FOIA1069) (on file with author).
120. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 30, 2009) (on file with author).
121. Letter from author to Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir.,
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Dec. 19, 2009) (on file with author).
122. Letter from U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement to author (Feb. 3,
2010) (on file with author).
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deferred action.123 No response from ICE was received. On July 12,
2010, a follow up e-mail was sent to ICE for a status update on the
March 30, 2010, request, but no response was received.124 On November 9, 2010, I followed up with a contact in ICE to inquire about
the status of my request and learned that ICE had no record of the
request.125 On November 24, 2010, ICE e-mailed me with a clarifying question about whether I preferred open or closed cases as well
as detained and non-detained cases.126 In January, 2011, I received a
yellow package from ICE holding a single compact disc containing a
single chart identifying only a handful of active deferred action cases
between the years of FY 2003 and 2010.127 This chart is pasted below and, if complete, indicates that ICE granted less than 500 deferred action cases between 2003 and 2010. I contacted ICE by
phone and e-mail in February, 2011, and at the time learned that ICE
had mistakenly sent the disc without a letter.128 ICE electronically
sent a formal decision letter on February 9, 2011.129 The letter itself
indicated that a full search of the ICE Office for Enforcement and
Removal yielded the single chart below.130

123. Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement & U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Mar. 30,
2010) (on file with author).
124. E-mail from Nicole Comstock, Research Assistant of author, to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (July 12, 2010, 11:20 EST) (on file with author).
125. E-mail from Andrew Strait, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to
author (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:51 EST) (on file with author).
126. E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, to author (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:07 EST) (on file with author).
127. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, NO. OF ACTIVE CASES
GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION STATUS SINCE CY 2003, (undated) (on file with
author).
128. E-mail from Ryan McDonald, Paralegal Specialist, Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to author (Feb. 2011, 12:27 EST) (“Attached is a copy of the ICE
response letter that was supposed to be included with the CD.”) (on file with author).
129. Id.
130. Id. Note that the letter itself was dated December 17, 2010.
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C. Chart Provided by ICE: Number of Active Cases Granted Deferred
Action Status Since CY 2003

CY
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

Detained
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
3

Non Detained
117
68
62
64
71
39
34
15
470

Total
117
68
62
64
71
39
36
16
473

As of IIDS November 29, 2010 as provided by the Statistical
Tracking Unit.
Data only reflects Deferred Action Granted and Case Status Active
(i.e. open cases). Data cannot be reported for Deferred Action Granted,
Case Status inactive (i.e. closed cases).
Concerned in part that ICE did not make a complete search, I
filed an appeal with ICE on March 29, 2011, hoping to receive more
data.131 As to the adequacy of its search, the appeal letter highlighted the data Wildes was able to retrieve in the late 1970s and early
2000s and also indicated:
Responsive records [to my FOIA request] exist that
were not included in ICE’s response. Specifically,
records on deferred action are required to be maintained under the Detention and Removal Operations
and Procedure Manual § 20.8(c). The Manual pro131. Letter from author to Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Mar.
29, 2011) (appealing adverse decision in FOIA matter 2011FOIA1845) (on file
with author).
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vides that all deferred action considerations be summarized using a Form G-312 and placed in the alien’s
A-file. Decisions regarding grants and denials of deferred action must also be in writing and signed by an
agency official making the determination. Production
of these records would be responsive to the original
FOIA request, even if redaction were required to protect an individual’s privacy interests . . . .132
On May 18, 2011, I contacted ICE by telephone and learned that
ICE had not received the FOIA appeal. As such, the appeal was entered into ICE’s system on May 18, 2011, nearly two months after
the original appeal was filed.133 On May 24, 2011, I communicated
for up to an hour with an ICE FOIA officer in charge of appeals to
clarify the procedural history of my FOIA request and confirmed
that the date of my original appeal letter was filed within sixty days
of ICE’s original decision letter, so that my appeal would be preserved.134 Hearing nothing for two months, I called the ICE FOIA
office on July 27, 2011 to inquire about the status of my appeal. I
was told that I would need to speak with the same ICE FOIA officer
and thereafter provided a callback number with the expectation that I
would receive a return phone call.135 In a letter dated September 27,
2011 ICE denied my appeal regarding the adequacy of ICE’s
search.136 According to the letter, ICE conducted an additional

132. Id.
133. Letter from Susan Mathias, Chief, Gov’t Info. Law Div., U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, to author (May 18,
2011) (“On behalf of the Chief for the Government Information Law Division, we
acknowledge your appeal request of 2011FOIA1845 and are assigning it number
OPLA11-181 for tracking purposes.”) (on file with author).
134. Phone Conversation with Mark Graff, Freedom of Info. Act Officer, U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (May 24, 2011) (discussing
2011FOIA1845).
135. Phone Call to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Freedom of Info.
Act Office (July 27, 2011) (attempting to discuss 2011FOIA1845 and OPLA11181).
136. Letter from Catrina M. Pavlik-Kennan, Freedom of Info. Act Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to author (Sep. 27, 2011) (regarding matter
number OPLA-181, 2011FOIAFOIA14736) (on file with author).
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search on remand of the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
(OPLA) and found that no records were responsive.137
D. FOIA Requests to USCIS
My initial FOIA request to USCIS headquarters was made on
October 6, 2009.138 A letter was sent from USCIS on October 9,
2009, which acknowledged receipt of my request and assigned it a
control number.139 On October 28, 2009, a second letter was sent
from USCIS, requesting additional information about the records
sought.140 More specifically, USCIS required the inquiry be made
regarding particular individuals with their consent. On February 9,
2010, the FOIA request was closed.141
I made a second and more detailed FOIA request on March 30,
2010. USCIS sent a response on April 1, 2010, assigning the request
a control number.142 As of August 31, 2010, my FOIA request was
listed on the USCIS website as 65 out of 219 requests pending in
Track 2. After nearly one year without a response, I discussed my
request with the Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services’
Ombudsman on February 25, 2011; the office, which had initiated a
study of deferred action processing, reviewed and inquired with
USCIS about the status of the FOIA request.143 On March 11, 2011,
I received an e-mail from a USCIS FOIA officer stating “[we have]
received most of the records responsive to your request and are contacting an additional program office to determine if additional rec-

137. Id.
138. Letter from author to U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. (Oct. 6, 2009)
(on file with author).
139. Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to
author (Oct. 9, 2009) (assigning FOIA request control number: NRC2009057166)
(on file with author).
140. Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to
author (Oct. 27, 2009) (concerning control number NRC2009057166) (on file with
author).
141. Id.
142. Letter from T. Diane Cejka, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., to
author (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with author).
143. E-mail from Gary Merson, Office of the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Serv. Ombudsman, to author (Feb. 25, 2011, 18:41 EST) (on file with author).
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ords exist on this subject.”144 Three months later, in a letter dated
June 17, 2011, USCIS responded to my FOIA request with three
compact discs, which together contained a cover letter, a 270-page
PDF document containing data, and several spreadsheets listing statistical data.145 A subsequent conversation with the FOIA officer
responsible for implementing the FOIA request indicated that deferred action records from FY 2003 through FY 2010 were requested
from every USCIS regional service center and field office.146 Because USCIS does not formally track information about deferred
action, the data I received was variable depending on the office and
location. It is neither possible to conclude that the records I received
were complete, nor is it possible to analyze the entirety of what I
received, because there is great disparity between how the data on
deferred action is collected and recorded by each office, if at all.
The legible data I received on deferred action came in one of three
variations: (1) spreadsheet or chart; (2) Form G-312s Deferred Action Case Summary; and/or (3) written request or memorandum by
the applicant or attorney seeking deferred action.147 To manage the
data and create a meaningful qualitative analysis, I did not incorporate data that was unclear or cases where deferred action appeared to
serve as a pre-adjudication form of relief – i.e., those who filed applications for relief as a victim of trafficking, crime, or abuse (a.k.a.,
prospective U or T visa holders).148

144. E-mail from Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom of Info. Act
Div., to author (Mar. 11, 2011, 13:48 EST) (referring to NRC2010021400) (on file
with the author). The email also estimated the author’s FOIA request would be
completed in approximately three months. Id.
145. Letter from Jill A. Eggleston, Dir., Freedom of Info. Act Operations, U.S.
Customs & Immigration Serv., to author (June 17, 2011) (on file with author); see
infra note 161.
146. Phone Conversation with Tembra Greenwood, Nat’l Records Ctr., Freedom
of Info. Act Div. (June 28, 2011).
147. Eggleston, supra note 145.
148. For an overview of how deferred action serves as important form of relief
for abuse victims who are eligible and awaiting trafficking related visas, see Letter
from organizations to Reps. Lamar Smith, John Conyers, Elton Gallegly, & Zoe
Lofgren (July 25, 2011) (on file with author).
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More than 100 cases involved Haitian citizens who entered the
United States after the 2010 earthquake.149 Much of the data on cases involving Haitians applying for deferred action after the earthquake lacked information about the factual information and/or outcome. About fifty of these cases included some information, mostly
in the form of copies of deferred action request letters submitted, and
involved individuals who: entered the United States as B-2 visitor;
were transported to the United States; had at least one family member already living in the United States; had their home destroyed
during the earthquake; and/or entered the United States with minor
children.150 In some cases, the applicant was forced to separate from
a spouse or child in Haiti.151 Below is a sampling of the case summaries provided in some of the USCIS logs:






Thirteen-year-old girl came to the United States
with her seventeen-year-old sister; house destroyed by earthquake; living with United States
Citizen (USC) aunt and legal guardian in the
United States; attending school in the United
States.152
Entered United States on B-2 visa with two
daughters, one a USC; owned warehouse in Haiti
that was destroyed by the earthquake; many customers killed in earthquake; living with brother in
United States.153
Entered United States with twelve-year-old USC
son as evacuees after earthquake in Haiti; home
and business destroyed by quake; son was injured
in earthquake.154

149. Eggleston, supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 7, 2010) (on
file with author).
153. Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June
22, 2010) (on file with author).
154. Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010) (on file with author).
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Entered with twelve-year-old daughter; left Haiti
to escape from man who had sexually abused his
daughter; the criminal escaped from jail when it
was damaged in earthquake and told subject he
was going to abuse daughter again.155
Infant USC daughter; family home destroyed in
earthquake; wife and one child entered the United
States as evacuees; children have health problems
as a result of the quake; wife persecuted by Haitian gang members.156
Transported to United States with three minor
children as evacuees following earthquake; one
child is a USC; home severely damaged; husband
remains in Haiti working and trying to rebuild
home.157
Transported to United States with three minor
children as evacuees following earthquake; infant
child is a USC; family home and business destroyed in quake; subject is diabetic and requires
insulin shots twice daily.158

In July 2011, the DHS Ombudsman recognized the influx in
post-earthquake cases from Haiti: “Over the past year, stakeholders
expressed concerns to the Ombudsman’s Office regarding the delayed processing of numerous deferred action requests submitted by
Haitian nationals following the earthquake in January 2010.”159

155. Letter from [name removed] to Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 10, 2010) (on
file with author).
156. Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June
21, 2010) (on file with author).
157. Affidavit in Support of Deferred Action Status for [name removed] (June
25, 2010) (on file with author).
158. Letter from [name removed] to A. Castro, Acting Field Office Dir., Dep't of
Homeland Sec. (June 30, 2010).
159. January Contreras, Deferred Action: Recommendations to Improve Transparency and Consistency in the USCIS Process, OFFICE OF THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP
&
IMMIGRATION
SERV.
OMBUDSMAN,
6
(2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb-combined-dar.pdf.
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The remaining qualitative data within the 270-page PDF document included 118 identifiable deferred action cases. It was difficult
to label a case as tender or elder age because much of the data lacked
identifiers. However, when a field included the word “minor,” “infant,” or a specific age (e.g., eighty-nine-year-old), the case was calculated as involving tender or elder age for purposes of this analysis.
It should also be mentioned that some of the cases approved, pending, or unknown contained little to no factual information and, as a
consequence, were not identified as bearing any of the “positive”
factors listed above.160 The outcomes for many of these cases were
unknown because the field was blank or there simply was not a field
in the log maintained by a particular office. Many of the cases also
had outcomes that were marked as “pending.” Of the 118 cases,
fifty-nine (59/118 or fifty percent) were pending or unknown; fortyeight (48/118 or 40.7%) were granted; and eleven (11/118 or 9.3%)
were denied.161
Among the 107 cases approved, pending, or unknown, fifty
(50/107 or 46.7%) involved a serious medical condition, nineteen
(19/107 or 17.8%) involved cases in which the applicant had USC
family members, twenty-two (22/107 or 21.5%) involved persons
who had resided in the United States for more than five years, and
thirty-two (32/107 or 29.9%) cases involved persons with a tender or
elder age.162 Many of these cases (29/107 or 27.1%) involved more
than one “positive” factor.163 For example, many of the cases
(10/107 or 9.3%) involved both a serious medical condition and
USC family members.164 Likewise, many of the cases (21/107 or
19.6%) involved both tender or elder age and a serious medical condition.165
Among the forty-eight granted cases, twenty-four (24/48 or 50%)
involved a serious medical condition; ten (10/48 or 20.8%) involved
160. See supra Part IV.A.
161. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs (June 17, 2011) (providing
dozens of documents including letters to the agency for deferred action, agency
responses, and regional offices’ case logs) (on file with author).
162. Id.
163. Id.; see supra Part IV.A.
164. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.
165. Id.
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cases in which the applicant had USC family members; four (4/48 or
8.3%) involved persons who had resided in the United States for
more than five years; and thirteen (13/48 or 27.1%) cases involved
persons with a tender or elder age.166 Many of these cases (12/48 or
25%) involved more than one “positive” factor.167 For example, four
(4/48 or 8.3%) of the cases involved both a serious medical condition and USC family members. Likewise, ten (10/48 or 20.8%) of
the cases involved both tender or elder age and a serious medical
condition.168
Below is a sampling of approved cases involving a serious medical condition, tender or elder age, and/or the presence of United
States Citizen family members:
 Eighty-nine-year-old man suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dementia, Alzheimer’s disease,
glaucoma, hypertension, and hypotension
 Twenty-two-year-old with Downs Syndrome unable to care for self; daughter of an LPR
 Entered U.S. as an EWI; --------- was in an automobile accident that rendered him in a quadriplegic in a vegetative state that requires continuous
care and supervision; Mother has Temporary Protected Status, living in FL.
 Cerebral palsy victim, Korean orphan with USC
sponsors
 Father of eight-year-old child receiving extensive
neurological treatment
 Father of eleven-year-old USC daughter with severe heart problems
 Mother of eleven-year-old USC daughter with severe heart problems
 Mother of U.S. national child with progressive
muscular dystrophy

166. Id.
167. Id.; see supra Part IV.A.
168. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.
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Forty-seven-year-old schizophrenic B-2 overstay;
son of LPR parents; USC siblings 169

E. Survey Monkey
As a supplement to my FOIA requests, I circulated an informal
survey to immigration attorneys and advocates using Survey Monkey.170 Specifically, my survey was sent by e-mail to the following
listservs: National Immigration Project, Detention Watch Network,
Immigration Professors, and other immigration advocates on May
22, 2011, May 31, 2011, and June 17, 2011.171 Most of the questions included in the survey were “multiple choice” and limited to a
series of possible answers. The survey included the following questions:
1. Have you ever applied for deferred action or prosecutorial discretion to USCIS or ICE?
2. Which agency did you apply to?
3. What type of action did you request?
4. In what geographic region did your request take place?
5. What was the result of your request?
6. What was the sex of your client?
7. What factors did your client have in their favor?
169. Id.
170. DEFERRED
ACTION
&
PROS.
DISCRETION,
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K (last visited July 18, 2011).
171. The body of the e-mail indicated:
I am continuing to research the agency's use of prosecutorial
discretion and deferred action in particular since FY 2003. This
research builds upon writing projects that are available here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=103
5598. At the moment, I have pending FOIA requests with the
DHS sub-agencies and have otherwise been informally collecting information from advocates about their experiences. If you
have applied for deferred action with DHS on or after FY 2003,
PLEASE CONSIDER TAKING THIS 5 MINUTE SURVEY
(one
survey
for
each
case):
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5DYY68K.
E-mail from author to Immigration listservs (May 22, 2011; May 31, 2011; June
17, 2011) (on file with author).
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 Tender age
 Elderly
 Medical condition
 Psychological condition
 DREAM Act eligible
 Widow of USC
 Military service
 Involvement in community
 Has children who are USCs
 Has other family members who are USCs
 Has little or no family in native country
 Has resided in the United States for over ten years
 Has resided in the Unites States since childhood
 Strong showing of community support
 Media coverage of the case
8. What negative factors negative factors did your client have
working against them?
 Criminal history
 Medical condition
 Psychological condition
 History of drug abuse
 Has ties to a gang
 Has only resided in the United States for a short time
 Has little or no family in the United States
 Could be easily removed to native country (or other
country)
 Has ties to a foreign organization at odds with the
U.S. government.172
9. Other Comments
The survey yielded seventy-two responses, fifty-eight of which
were deferred action cases.173 Despite the small sample size, the
surveys are revealing about the primary factors that drive deferred
172. Id.
173. Survey Monkey Results, Deferred Action & Pros. Discretion (on file with
author).
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action requests. Among the fifty-eight deferred action cases, nine
were denied, thirty-five were granted, seven were pending, one was
unknown, and six lacked a response from the agency.174 Notably,
twenty-four of the thirty-five granted cases involved more than one
positive factor.175 Below are a few case examples where a deferred
action grant involved more than one positive factor:










Case # 1 - Psychological condition
Involvement in community
Has children who are USCs
Has other family members who are USCs
Has little or no family in native country
Case # 2 - Medical Condition
Has children who are USCs
Has other family members who are USCs
Has resided in the United States for over ten
years
Strong showing of community support
Media coverage of the case
Case # 3 - Medical Condition
Psychological condition
Has children who are USCs
Has resided in the United States for over ten
years
Case #4 - Medical Condition
Psychological condition
Has children who are USCs
Has other family members who are USCs
Case #5 - Tender Age
Has children who are USCs
Has little or no family in native country
Has resided in the United States for over ten
years
Strong showing of community support.176

174. Id.
175. Id.; see supra Part IV.A.
176. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173.
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Notably, the positive factors indicated for the nine cases denied
were largely similar to the cases granted.177 Moreover, only two of
the nine cases involved criminal history, insofar as such a history
might have caused a negative decision.178 In fact, six of the nine
cases denied included more than one of the positive factors reflected
in the granted cases.179 This raises a concern that cases involving
similarly relevant facts resulted in a different outcome, which intersects with the forthcoming discussion about the importance of transparency. The foregoing analysis of deferred action cases obtained
by USCIS and through Survey Monkey indicate that five equitable
factors influence deferred action grants: (1) serious medical condition; (2) tender or elder age; (3) long term residence in the United
States; (4) presence of USC children in the United States; and/or (5)
other USC family members in the United States.180
While the grant rate for deferred action cases might cause alarm
for those who challenge the deferred action program as an abuse of
executive branch authority, it should be clear that regardless of outcome, the number of deferred action cases considered by ICE and
USCIS are quite low. These numbers suggest that the real concern
lies in the fact that many non-citizens who meet the common criteria
utilized by the agency in assessing deferred action lack access or
knowledge about deferred action, the process for applying, and basic
eligibility requirements. Even doubling the number of legible deferred action grants produced by USCIS and ICE between 2003 and
2010 (118 plus 946) yields less than 1,100 cases, or less than 130
cases annually! One can appreciate this exceptionally low number
when comparing it to the unauthorized immigrant population (10.8
million181); number of persons removed in 2010 (387,000182); or the
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.; supra Part IV.A.
180. Survey Monkey Results, supra note 173; see supra Part IV.A.
181. Michael Hoefer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2010, 1
(2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf.
182. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS:
2010
OFFICE
OF
IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS
2
(2011),
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number of persons placed in removal proceedings in 2010 (approx.
300,000183).
The next section challenges the agency’s lack of transparency
about the deferred action program and offers specific recommendations for rulemaking and greater transparency. The goals behind
these recommendations are not geared primarily towards escalating
the grant rate to unmanageable levels, but rather to ensuring that
immigrants bearing equities similar to the ones already utilized by
the agency in assessing deferred action requests are given equal consideration.
V. THE DEFERRED ACTION PROGRAM LACKS TRANSPARENCY
From the earliest days, when prosecutorial discretion was revealed in 1975, up to the present, the immigration agency has lacked
transparency about both the various forms of prosecutorial discretion
and deferred action in particular.184 Whereas the agency has continued to include its authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in
various memoranda and manuals, it has been less willing to offer
statistics on the individuals granted discretionary relief under prosecutorial discretion, or the method by which one should go about applying for such relief.185 The data above also shows that attorneys
who are fortunate enough to figure out the deferred action process
and make a formal request are not always guaranteed a response by
the Department.
The agency’s lack of transparency about deferred action is also
evidenced by my experience in requesting information about dehttp://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar2010.pdf.
183. Statement of Juan P. Osuna, supra note 39, at 2. Note that while the actual
testimony suggests that 325,326 proceedings were receiving by EOIR in FY 2010,
I have reduced the number to accommodate those proceedings which are unrelated
to formal removal proceedings such as bond proceedings and motions proceedings.
184. See Wildes, The Litigative Use of the FOIA, supra note 2, at 42-43.
185. The most revealing information about deferred action is included in the
memoranda and is limited to informing the public and authorization officials that
deferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion. See e.g. Meissner Memo,
supra note 19.
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ferred action cases from ICE, CBP, and USCIS.186 Seeking to update Wildes’s studies, I filed multiple FOIA requests to the DHS
sub-agencies (ICE, CBP, and USCIS) beginning in October 2009,
inquiring first about all records and policies pertaining to prosecutorial discretion decisions, and later narrowing the request to deferred
action cases.187 The intermittent letters by the DHS sub-agencies
seeking clarification and/or closing the request altogether sheds light
on the difficulty in obtaining basic information about prosecutorial
discretion generally and deferred action in particular.188
Notably, USCIS conducted a complete search to produce a 270page PDF document in addition to statistical charts about deferred
action.189 However, the data itself was variable and incomplete because the agency does not have a clear tracking mechanism for deferred action cases. Moreover, not only did the data I receive come
more than one year after my initial request, I had the assistance of
the DHS Ombudsman, who agreed to help move my FOIA request;
like the deferred action process itself, my experience illustrates how
an accidental phone call with a government official can influence
outcomes more readily than merit and the following of vague procedures.190

186. See supra Part IV.B.
187. Letter to Sub-agencies, supra note 121; Letter from author to U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with author).
188. See supra Part IV.B for my procedural history in obtaining information from
USCIS and ICE. Note that my FOIA request with CBP was ultimately closed
without any data. My initial request was made to CBP on October 6, 2009. On
October 26, 2009, an email reply was sent from Ada Symister of CBP’s Office of
International Trade, requesting clarification. A reply to Ms. Symister was sent on
November 4, 2009. On November 9, 2009 an additional e-mail was sent from
Elissa Kay of CBP’s Office of International Trade seeking further clarification on
the information sought in the FOIA request. A response was sent to Ms. Kay on
November 11, 2009. There was no additional response from CBP. On March 30,
2010 I made a second, more detailed FOIA request to CBP. On April 29, 2010
CBP responded to the request stating that the information sought is under the purview of USCIS and that the request should be forwarded there.
189. Freedom of Info. Act Request Responses & Logs, supra note 161.
190. According to the DHS Ombudsman, USCIS Headquarters has recently begun
tracking deferred action requests in local offices. See Contreras, supra note 159,
at 5.
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In the case of ICE, the result of a single chart detailing active
cases in which deferred action was granted was thin on detail about
the facts involved in each case, the process by which deferred action
was considered, the evidence presented to meet eligibility for deferred action, and the conditions under which each case was granted.
Even if I were to concede that the data provided by ICE constitutes
the universe of active deferred action cases granted between 2003
and 2010, this raises questions about ICE’s recordkeeping regarding
inactive cases, the number of applications filed and received by ICE,
the number of cases denied by ICE, the number of cases initiated as
a deferred action requested and treated as something else (i.e., stay
of removal), and so on. Tracking this data is important both for the
agency and the public.191
In the case of CBP, I can only speculate that CBP lacks a specific
policy about how it executes prosecutorial discretion generally and
deferred action particularly.192 My FOIA experience also suggests
that CBP lacks data about prosecutorial discretion grants or denials.
Together, these limitations give CBP the lowest transparency marks
within DHS.193 The next section explores the normative benefits of
191. Notably, the Secretary of DHS testified on June 28 about her willingness to
share data about deferred action cases with the Senate Judiciary Committee. In
response to a question posed by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) she noted:
Senator, we've had an awful lot of correspondence with the
committee on various issues. But I think the point of the question is would we agree to some oversight of how the deferred action process is being administered? And the answer is we want
to be very transparent about how we are exercising the authorities the statutes give us.
DREAM Act Education for Alien Minors: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Refugees & Border Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland
Sec.),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=
3d9031b47812de2592c3 baeba604d881.
192. See supra note 148.
193. My research is consistent with recent findings by the DHS Ombudsman with
regards to transparency and the deferred action program within USCIS:
Stakeholders lack clear, consistent information regarding
requirements for submitting a deferred action request and
what to expect following submission of the request. There
is no formal national procedure for handling deferred action requests. When experiencing a change in the type or
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transparency generally and codifying a regulation about deferred
action in particular.
A. Why Transparency Matters
Transparency about deferred action matters and is premised first
on the acceptance that an officer or agency’s decision about deferred
action is an adjudicatory function that demands the same kind of
analysis that would be given to other immigration benefits that fall
within the formal adjudicatory framework. There is no shortage of
literature scrutinizing an administrative process against a set of normative values.194 Administrative law scholar Roger Cramton has

number of submissions, local USCIS offices often lack the
necessary standardized process to handle such requests in a
timely and consistent manner. As a result, many offices
permit deferred action requests to remain pending for extended periods. Stakeholders lack information regarding
the number and nature of deferred action requests submitted each year; and they are not provided with any information on the number of cases approved and denied, or the
reasons underlying USCIS’ decisions.
Contreras, supra note 161, at 1.
194.
See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary
Step Toward Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 263-64 (2002)
[hereinafter Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders]; Lenni B. Benson, Making
Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37, 40
(2006-2007); Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of
S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REV. 108, 112
(1963) [hereinafter Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform]; Roger C.
Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58
VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 80 (1983) (arguing for a “precision calculus”
framework for interpreting adjudicative rules, which leads to more transparency
and accessibility); Family, supra note 19, at 598 (examining the problem of diverting individuals away from immigration administrative adjudication); Stephen H.
Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1313-14 (1986); David A. Martin,
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 1247, 1322 (1990); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 419-21
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identified “accuracy,” “efficiency,” and “acceptability” as goals for
evaluating administrative designs. Immigration law scholar Steven
Legomsky has also explored “consistency” in asylum adjudications
along with the criteria identified by Cramton.195 Administrative and
immigration law scholar Lenni Benson has examined transparency
as a separate process value.196 For purposes of this article, I analyze
the values of equal justice, accuracy, consistency, efficiency, and
acceptability in the deferred action context. I chose these criteria
because I believe that the lack of transparency in deferred action undermines these values and underscores why transparency is so important. I concede that many of the values analyzed below are overlapping in that one bears relationship to another.
B. Equal Justice197
Transparency can promote a fair process and more equitable outcomes. One of the most important benefits of transparency is perhaps the least obvious: the reduction to the number of requests for
deferred action that are never made because the individual who may
qualify is unaware of the process. To my knowledge, no public
memoranda from DHS have authorized employees to automatically
consider cases for deferred action before they enter the system, if at
all. The Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step in
the right direction by indicating that it is “preferable for ICE officers,
agents, and attorneys to consider prosecutorial discretion in cases
without waiting for an alien or alien’s advocate or counsel to request
a favorable exercise of discretion.”198
There is also a fairness component to the practical uncertainty
faced by non-citizens. It is possible that a potential beneficiary of
deferred action is aware of the process but is unable to decide
(1972) (discussing the inconsistencies broad discretionary power imposes on administrative decisions in an immigration context).
195. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 111–12;
Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313.
196. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 262–63.
197. While Cramton intentionally analyzes accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability
as an alternative to “fairness” or “due process,” I think it is appropriate to mention
how the current deferred action program undermines these latter values.
198. Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 4, at 5.
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whether he should hire an attorney and apply for it. Moreover, an
applicant for deferred action who never hears back from the agency
is unable to plan his affairs because he is unaware about the outcome
of his case. Even where the individual has been granted deferred
action and given a legitimate basis for work authorization, a U.S.
employer might be unsure about whether to hire the individual because of the secrecy or in-limbo nature of deferred action. All of
these scenarios have a fairness component that should be considered
when thinking about the protections and greater certainty of other
discretionary remedies.
Finally, and less clear, is the subject of due process, which at the
very least requires that the interests at stake bear some relationship
to the procedures.199 In deferred action cases, the interest at stake for
the non-citizen is significant. If deferred action is denied or never
considered, the consequences could include arrest, detention, deportation, or a combination of the three. The deferred action program
also lacks notice. As it stands, many people who apply for deferred
action have hired a lawyer who is familiar with the process.200
Whereas these interests lie at the top of the “hierarchy” of actions
that deprive the individual of liberty, the scenario is complicated by
the fact that most individuals applying for or eligible to apply for
deferred action do not have a formally recognizable immigration
status.201 On the other hand, many such individuals have resided in
the United States for a meaningful number of years. The Supreme
Court has more than once concluded that “[o]nce an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or per-

199. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). There, the Supreme Court
distinguished the need for a preliminary hearing in administering disability benefits from welfare benefits on the basis that a welfare recipient warrants a hearing
because he could be deprived of the “very means by which to live while he waits.”
Id. at 340.
200. On the other hand, the government might view that greater notice will increase the incentives to utilize deferred action as a delay tactic. See Paul R.
Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1170
(1984).
201. Id. at 1150.
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manent.”202 Furthermore, the Court compared deportation to “banishment or exile.”203
C. Efficiency
Efficiency refers to the time and expense invested in a particular
process. Professor Cramton explains efficiency “emphasizes the
time, effort, and expense of elaborate procedures. The work of the
world must go on, and endless nitpicking, while it may produce a
more nearly ideal solution, imposes huge costs and impairs other
important values.”204 On the one hand, one might think that the current deferred action design is superbly efficient because it lacks the
costs associated with an application form or process, lacks review by
an administrative or judicial appellate body, lacks recordkeeping or
reporting by the Department, and so on. On the other hand, the lack
of transparency about the deferred action program has resulted in
congressional inquiries about the Department’s recordkeeping, research by the DHS Ombudsman on how to improve deferred action
processes, and lengthy FOIAs between the author and the Department. Similarly, the Department’s review of voluminous submissions by attorneys fortunate enough to know about deferred action
and the ensuing correspondence that takes place between Department employees and attorneys because of the lack of guidance or
process conceivably results in great costs to the government. In
short, the lack of transparency about deferred action has resulted in
enormous monetary expenses and personal time for the Department.
D. Accuracy
Accuracy means that once an adjudicator interprets relevant factors, the law that is applied to the factors is correct and the conclusion is consistent with the sources of law. To Professor Benson,
202. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001).
203. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“We resolve the doubts in
favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile. . . . [W]e will not assume that Congress meant
to trench on [the individual’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”).
204. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform, supra note 194, at 112.
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“[a]ccuracy ensures the law is being carried out, and not undermined
through error or fraud.”205 Practically, it is difficult to measure the
accuracy of the current deferred action program because the government does not maintain basic information about the process and
its decisions. Moreover, the deferred action program undervalues
the accuracy objective, because it prevents potentially eligible individuals from applying for deferred action and immunizes officers
from liability when a deferred action is denied or disregarded altogether. If a person is denied deferred action but has facts similar to a
family member who was granted deferred action in a neighboring
region, it can be identified as inaccurate. Similarly, if the same person never applies for deferred action because she does not have a
lawyer and is otherwise unaware of the program, accuracy is also
disregarded. When a person has the opportunity to consult with published criteria after being denied deferred action, he is able to understand the reasons for this denial and, if appropriate, enable the agency to catch errors.206
E. Consistency
To Professor Benson, “[c]onsistency, not only of outcome, but
also of treatment along the way, is required to maintain fairness
among and between participants, and thus, is necessary to foster respect for and trust in the system.”207 Americans also value consistency because it treats similarly situated people equally. In sharp
contrast, decisions about deferred action are uneven and in some
cases unknown to attorneys and advocates who file applications.208
Transparency about the deferred action process promotes consistency by directing potential applicants to a similar procedure at the front
205. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263.
206. E-mail from Stephen Legomsky to author (July 16, 2011, 19:41 EST) (on file
with author).
207. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263.
208. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 159, at 5 (“USCIS does not have a nationwide process for acknowledging the receipt of deferred action requests, but many
USCIS offices have implemented a local method for logging submissions and
acknowledging their receipt. Other offices do not issue a written acknowledgement of receipt for deferred action requests.”); Wadhia, supra note 36; Survey
Monkey, supra note 170.
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end, and ensuring more consistent outcomes at the back end.209 The
importance of transparency and consistency in deferred action cases
was also highlighted by DHS’ own Ombudsman in 2007 when he
remarked:
[M]inimal measures, including tracking requests for
deferred action and regular review by USCIS headquarters of the requests and the determinations made,
would help to ensure that there is no geographic disparity in approvals or denials of deferred action requests and that like cases are decided in like manner.
....
If implemented, this recommendation would make
USCIS more efficient by tracking requests for deferred action and helping to ensure consistency in adjudications.210
Consistency is also enhanced when officers are held accountable
for their actions. My own belief is that a more transparent process
for deferred action can have a disciplinary effect on the adjudicator
and, as a consequence, advance the quality and consistency of decisions on deferred action. A similar argument has been set forth by
Professor Legomsky in his writings about the benefits of agency review when he remarks:
I believe that the mere prospect of review can have a
sobering effect on administrative officials. Most of
us do not like to be embarrassed, especially in our
work. When we know that someone might be scruti209. Legomsky contends that the arguments supporting an agency’s head to review adjudicative decisions for the purpose of promoting consistency fall short,
since there are other alternatives that are no less consistent. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 413, 458 (2007) [hereinafter Legomsky, Learning
to Live with Unequal Justice]; see also Legomsky, supra note 194.
210. Recommendation from Prakash Kharti, Ombudsman, U.S. Customs & Immigration Serv., to Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigrtion
Serv., 3–4 (Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOmbudsman
_RR_32_O_Deferred_Action_04-06-07.pdf.
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nizing our work and testing our reasons, we have an
extra incentive to approach our decisions carefully. . . .211
F. Acceptability
Acceptability is not so much focused on whether a particular
process is in fact fair or acceptable, but rather on whether the procedure is perceived to be fair by members of the public and parties to
the process.212 Here, my specific recommendation for promulgating
a rule on deferred action subsumes the “so what” of transparency in
that rulemaking itself ensures that members of the public are provided with an opportunity to provide input before a rule is made final.
More predictable rules and procedures about deferred action also
promote acceptability because non-citizens and attorneys can make
reliable plans based on an articulated set of criteria proffered by the
agency and, over time, a body of case law to indicate how these criteria are applied to individual cases.213
From the agency’s perspective, transparency about deferred action and publication of a regulation may be more trouble than it is
worth. “Transparent rules tend to spotlight a value choice. Opponents of that choice will attack the agency's action, forcing the agency to expend its own resources for defense. Rules having low transparency thus become more attractive, since they conceal value
choices.”214 The agency might argue that transparency by the Department about prosecutorial discretion and deferred action in particular could result in a storm of objections by restrictionists and other
members of the public who equate deferred action to an “amnesty”
that received no support by Congress.215 In response to any concern
that a published rule on deferred action is akin to a “backdoor legalization” program, I would opine that a legislative scheme is distin211. See, e.g., Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 206,
458; Stephen H. Legomsky, Refugees, Administrative Tribunals, and Real Independence: Dangers Ahead for Australia, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 245 (1998).
212. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 194, at 1313.
213. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 426–
28.
214. Diver, supra note 194, at 106.
215. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 36, at 6 & n.22.
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guishable and more generous in both its application and its benefits.
For example, the published rule proposed in this article would be
limited to non-citizens who possess specific qualities and criteria and
enable the individual to be legally present in the country and apply
for work authorization.216 In contrast, a legalization program includes the benefits of temporary residence, work authorization, permission to travel, and a path to green card status and eventual citizenship.217
The concern that a published rule on deferred action may attract
future illegal migration is a legitimate one, but this concern can be
addressed by catering the rule to people who meet specific qualifying criteria and, if appropriate, setting an annual numerical cap.
Since the agency already employs specific criteria for considering
deferred action cases, spelling out the criteria in a published rule
would not necessarily create a new or objectionable policy for the
Department, but would advance the goals of equal justice, accuracy,
consistency, efficiency, and acceptability. Achieving these values
requires transparency about how deferred action works as well as a
newly codified regulation subject to the “notice and comment” requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).218
Nevertheless, the immigration agency has previously held reservations about promulgating rules under the APA. The best illustration of this was in 1979, when the former INS proposed a rule that
would have explained the various criteria utilized by officers in determining the discretionary component of “adjustment of status” and
other immigration remedies involving a discretionary component.219
216. See infra Part VI.
217. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2011, S. 1258, 112th
Cong. (2011); Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy
Act of 2007, H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. (2007).
218. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2011).
219. See Factors To Be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion,
44 Fed. Reg. 36,187, 36,191 (June 21, 1979) (proposing 8 C.F.R. 245.8); see also
Diver, supra note 194, at 94; Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 284-86
(“Several provisions of these proposed regulations would have required a favorable exercise of discretion in the absence of adverse factors. For example, with
regard to the exercise of discretion under the former 212(c) waiver, the rule identified the following factors for consideration in the exercise of discretion: ‘alien is
likely to continue type of activity which gave rise to the grounds of excludability;
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In most cases, to qualify for adjustment of status, the non-citizen
must generally have a qualifying relationship with a U.S. employer
or family member, be admissible to the United States, and have a
visa immediately available to him or her.220 In addition to meeting
these statutory criteria, the applicant must qualify for adjustment as a
matter of discretion. The discretionary component has not been defined in the statute or the regulations, but at one time was articulated
in the former INS O.I. as requiring “substantial equities.”221 The
published rules would have given clarity to the discretion exercised
in adjustment of status and other cases but was instead repealed in
1981 because the INS feared that:
[l]isting some factors, even with the caveat that such
list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use of
guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to an
abuse of discretion . . . . The INS also argued that the
rules would “eliminate discretionary powers by converting discretionary powers into a body of law.”222
INS’ fear of litigation is not merely theoretical, but underscored by a
relating memorandum to then INS Commissioner Lionel J. Castillo
who remarked:
[T]he proposals embodied in this draft would subject
the Service to a constant barrage of spurious appeal
[sic] by Immigration attorneys on the basis of semantics proposed to be injected into the regulations.
They subvert Government to the vagaries of attorney
dilatory tactics and would appear to tie our hands

alien has a history of criminal, immoral, narcotic, or subversive activity; act giving
rise to grounds of excludability was relatively recent; no unusual hardship would
accrue to alien or family members if the waiver is denied.’”) (citations omitted).
220. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006).
221. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, O.I.
§ 245.5d(5), available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/00-0-1/0-0-0-53690/0-0-0-60138/0-0-0-60293.html; see also Diver, supra note 194,
at 93.
222. Wadhia, supra note 3, at 284–85 & n.238.
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completely in the cobwebs of endless liturgical [sic]
dialogue.223
The agency’s desire for flexibility and fear of litigation are not
new, and have historically served as a basis for less transparency.224
But the argument from an agency that regulatory language providing
factors to assess discretionary adjudication would limit its flexibility
is unpersuasive. First, the Department has the ability to craft a rule
that both lists criteria and adopts a discretionary component. In fact,
there are many humanitarian-like remedies that operate in this way.
For example, cancellation of removal is a remedy codified in the
statute in 1996 that is available to eligible non-LPRs and LPRs who
meet specific statutory requirements, such as continuous physical
presence and residence in the United States for a specified time period, or hardship to a qualifying family member who is either a green
card holder or USC, among other requirements.225 Similarly, the
O.I., Meissner Memo, and Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion all include a listing of factors that should be considered by immigration officers, agents, or attorneys, but qualifies that list of relevant factors as illustrative. More important, the factors used by the
agency to make decisions about deferred action are identifiable and
operate as a “benefit” for those non-citizens fortunate enough to
have a knowledgeable attorney who can apply for it.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recognize Deferred Action as a Rule
Deferred action should be published as a rule in the Federal Register.226 The regulation should be subject to a 120-day public notice
223. Diver, supra note 194, at 95 (citing to Memorandum from [name and position deleted], INS, to Lionel Castillo, Commissioner, INS (September 12, 1978), at
1.).
224. See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64.
225. INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
226. See Wadhia, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 3, at 286; See also
AILA’s comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s implementation of
Executive Order 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.” Special
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and comment period. The regulatory language as proposed must
recognize both the humanitarian and economical bases for deferred
action. The advantages of rulemaking promotes the values that are
so interconnected with principles of administrative law, including
but not limited to transparency, consistency, acceptability, and accountability. As described by Professor Legomsky:
[R]ulemaking has tremendous advantages over adjudication as a vehicle for policy formation. These advantages include broader public input, notice to Congress, avoidance of adjudicative hearings to resolve
issues of legislative fact, avoidance of litigating the
same issues repeatedly, more enforceable rules, clearer advance notice of allowable and prohibited conduct, fairer applicability of the rules to similarly situated individuals at different points in time, and the
opportunity for affected individuals to make policy
submissions before the rule is adopted.227
In addition to advancing various process values, rulemaking
would assist with narrowing the various factors used by adjudicators
to determine whether deferred action should be granted. An analysis
thanks to the AILA Interagency Liaison Committee. AILA Doc. No. 11041463
(“Guidance on deferred action was contained in the now withdrawn INS Operating
Instructions. Though the relief is still available, there are currently no regulations
that would facilitate a more meaningful and consistent application of prosecutorial
discretion in context of deferred action. We ask that such regulations be promulgated.”).
227. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 459;
see also id. at 423 & n.67 (“Inconsistent procedures and inconsistent employment
criteria for adjudicators were among the problems that inspired the Administrative
Procedure Act”). For an insightful description, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APAAdjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65,
65-68 (1996). These problems were also the focus of a superb consultants’ report
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States. Paul R. Verkuil
et al., Report For Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative Judiciary, in
2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS 777 (1992). See also Recommendations and Statements of the Administrative Conference, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,759 (Dec. 29, 1992) (codified at 1 C.F.R.
pts. 305, 310) (recommending many of the reforms urged by the consultants’ report).
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of the data on deferred action cases indicate that decisions are based
on distinguishable criteria and that a single regulation would only
bolster the application of this criteria in like cases, and stave the inevitable abuse of discretion that stems from a system where cases are
decided by different regional officers and without accountability.
The benefit of using rules to guide discretionary decisions is not a
new argument and has been affirmed by scholars in various other
immigration contexts.228
Rulemaking is also cost-effective. I believe the costs associated
with rulemaking would be recovered by enabling immigration adjudicators to follow a clear rule. Clearer rules on deferred action could
also remove the costs associated with documenting every rationale
and factor in a particular A-file, gaining approval from a supervisor
before granting deferred action, or ICE attorneys having to review
every NTA for sufficiency under the prosecutorial discretion guidelines. Interestingly enough, the internal checks and balances created
by the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, however important, are a costly endeavor that could be streamlined by crafting a
rule limited to deferred action cases. I also believe that implementation of a regulation would not particularly increase litigious costs
but, to the contrary, infuse a level of internal quality control and incentive for immigration adjudicators to apply the rule faithfully.229
The proposed rule should include information about the scope of
deferred action, namely that it is a temporary benefit available to
eligible non-citizens who meet specific criteria and who warrant deferred action as a matter of discretion. The agency should create a
form for deferred action requests, and attach a nominal fee for processing the form. An applicant who is unable to pay a filing fee
should be eligible to fill out a fee-waiver form. The application
should be filed to the Vermont Service Center or another regional
Service Center. By maintaining all applications at a specific service
center, it will be easier for DHS to keep statistics and also adjudicate
related requests for work authorization. The rule should be discre228. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 194, at 421; Verkuil, supra note 200, at 1205–
06.
229. Diver, supra note 194, at 95; Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice, supra note 209, at 463.

File: Wadhia - Vol. 10, Iss. 1, V2

2012

Created on: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

DEFERRED ACTION AND IMMIGRATION LAW

Last Printed: 4/17/2012 1:01:00 PM

63

tionary and place the burden on the non-citizen to present substantial
equities that may include: continuous residence in the United States
for at least ten years; presence of a USC or LPR child, spouse, or
parent in the United States; serious mental health condition or physical disability; and/or tender or elderly age.
While my proposal provides concrete guidelines, it offers flexibility for the Department to consider equally compelling factors not
listed. That said, my goal is not to “codify” previous memoranda
like the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion, but instead to
create a discreet remedy in the form of deferred action that is based
on an identifiable set of factors that (as illustrated by the data) the
agency has relied upon for more than thirty years. The Department
will and should continue to follow the current memoranda on prosecutorial discretion when making prosecutorial decisions. Deferred
action is merely one slice of the scores of decisions that currently
serve as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Those who are denied deferred action should receive a written
decision with reasons for the denial. Written decisions promote accuracy, consistency, and acceptability by allowing the applicant to
be heard. While written decisions would likely add costs onto the
agency, these costs could be offset by the fees that accompany the
new deferred action form and the current costs associated with the
internal checks and reviews that accompany deferred action processing.
Those who are successful in obtaining a deferred action grant
should be granted temporary residence for a renewable three-year
period, work authorization, and permission to travel for good cause.
A grant of deferred action should not lead to permanent residency,
but neither should it prohibit a grantee from applying for a more
permanent legal benefit if she is otherwise eligible. The period during which an individual is in deferred action status should be recognized as a lawful status as is currently the case.230 If the newly pro-

230. See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director, Domestic Operations Directorate, Lori Scialabba, Associate Director Refugee, Asylum
and International Operations Directorate, Consolidation of Guidance Concerning
Unlawful Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)
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posed regulation on deferred action needs alteration, the Department
should make adjustments to the regulation “relying on exceptions,
time extensions, variances, and waivers.”231
B. Publicize Information About Deferred Action
The Department of Homeland Security should train immigration
employees about the new rule. Moreover, DHS should create a system whereby every case that is brought to the Department’s attention
is automatically considered for deferred action. Alternatively, individuals who are facing removal before EOIR or DHS should be notified about their right to apply for deferred action before USCIS.
Information about deferred action should be posted on the relevant
DHS websites. This information should include a step-by-step process about how to apply for deferred action, basic eligibility requirements, and related benefits. If a policy is implemented whereby
DHS automatically considered cases for deferred action, then such
policy should be posted on the various DHS websites and also accompanied by a “Fact Sheet” in user-friendly English.232 Even if the
procedures themselves are not codified as regulations, they should be
published in the Federal Register.
Finally, DHS must publish the facts of individual cases as well
as decisions about deferred action and keep statistics about the cases
in which deferred action is considered, denied, and/or granted. Such
statistics must be made part of the annual statistics published by
of the Act, 42 (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/
Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/ revision_redesign_AFM.PDF
231. Raising the Agency’s Grades – Protecting the Economy, Assuring Regulatory
Quality and Improving Assessments of Regulatory Need, Subcomm. on Courts,
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. (2011) (citing Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004) (statement of Robert L. Glicksman)),
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
pdf/Glicksman03292011.pdf.
232. As noted before, the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion takes a step
forward by asking ICE employees to initiate decision on prosecutorial discretion
without waiting for an affirmative request by an attorney. Note however that the
language does not create a mandate or “automatic” process nor does it imply that
in all cases deferred action (which is but a sliver in the universe of ways in which
prosecutorial discretion can be exercised) will be considered as the remedy.
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DHS and also posted on the various websites. DHS must publish the
training officers receive on deferred action. Cumulatively, publishing information about the deferred action process, related decisions,
statistics, and training programs will advance transparency and acceptability, while also providing the public with tools for measuring
efficiency, accuracy, and consistency in deferred action cases.233
VII.

APPENDIX: TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

Administrative Procedures Act – APA
American Immigration Council – Immigration Council
American Immigration Lawyers Association – AILA
Board of Immigration Appeals – BIA or Board
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties – CRCL
Customs and Border Protection – CBP
Deferred Action – DA
Department of Homeland Security – DHS or Department
Department of Justice – DOJ or Justice
Doris Meissner, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion – Meissner
Memo
Executive Office for Immigration Review – EOIR
Immigration and Customs Enforcement – ICE
Immigration and Nationality Act – INA or the Act
Immigration and Naturalization Service – INS
John Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton Memo
on Civil Enforcement Priorities
John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent
with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for
the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens – Morton
Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion
Notice to Appear – NTA
Office of the Principal Legal Adviser – OPLA
Operations Instruction – O.I.
Prosecutorial Discretion – PD
233. See, e.g., Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders, supra note 194, at 263–
64.
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United States Citizen – USC
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services – USCIS
VII. POSTSCRIPT
This article was completed in July 2011. Subsequently, on August 18, 2011, the White House “announced” a policy whereby an
interagency working group consisting of officials from DOJ and
DHS would review 300,000 cases pending removal and as a matter
of prosecutorial discretion administratively close cases that are
deemed “low priority.”234 Without spelling out a legal vehicle or
process, the announcement also suggested that individuals whose
cases were successfully closed would be eligible for work authorization.235 Thereafter, ICE issued a series of documents in November
2011 to implement the August 18th announcement.236 Together, these documents identified the Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion as the “cornerstone” for what officers should follow in making
234. Cecilia Munoz, Immigration Update: Maximizing Public Safety and Better
Focusing Resources, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 2:00 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/immigration-update-maximizingpublic-safety-and-better-focusing-resources; see also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Sivaprasad Wadhia on the White House’s Review of Removal Cases,
IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Sept. 4, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com
/immigration /2011/09/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia-on-the-white-houses-review-ofremoval-cases.html.
235. Wadhia, supra note 234.
236. See Memorandum from Peter Vincent, Principle Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on Case-by-Case Review of Incoming and
Certain Pending Cases (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib
/foia/dro_policy_memos/case-by-case-review-incoming-certain-pending-casesmemorandum.pdf.; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, GUIDANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP,
USCIS, AND ICE CASES BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos
/guidance-to-ice-attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf;
U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, NEXT STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION MEMORANDUM AND THE AUGUST 18TH ANNOUNCEMENT ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/pros-discretion-next-steps.pdf.
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prosecutorial discretion decisions; furnished an additional set of substantive criteria officers should use to making short term decisions
about prosecutorial discretion; explained that every ICE officer authorized to exercise such discretion would be trained by January 13,
2012; launched a short-term process for reviewing select cases entering the immigration court or pending removal for prosecutorial discretion in the form of administrative closure; and initiated a special
review of cases pending removal at the Denver and Baltimore immigration courts. A detailed analysis of these initiatives is beyond the
scope of this article. While there remain a number of outstanding
and unresolved questions about these protocols237, the author
acknowledges that the steps the Administration has taken improves
the process and application of prosecutorial discretion in immigration matters.238

237. For example, many of these protocols sunset in January 2012; appear to be
limited to non-detained cases; fail to address a specific procedure for individuals
who lack counsel; appear to limit the immediately available forms of prosecutorial
discretion to remedies that provide no independent basis for work authorization;
seem to widen the list of “negative” factors ICE officers should consider in the
short term as a basis for denying prosecutorial discretion; and provide no guarantee or process for reviewing cases that result in a denial or creating a public record
that includes a listing of cases considered, denied or granted prosecutorial discretion.
238. For an analysis of the November 2011 documents and a related letter by the
American Bar Association, see ALEXSA ALONZO & MARY KENNEY, DHS REVIEW
OF LOW PRIORITY CASES FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2011), available at
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/DHS_Review_of_Low_Priorit
y_Cases_9-1-11.pdf; Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Director of ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to John Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/uncategorized/2011/gao/2011dec15_prosecdiscreetion_l.authcheckdam.pdf

